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SUMMARY
We examine the potential impact of TTIP through trade-cost reductions, applying a
mix of econometric and computational methods to develop estimates of the beneﬁts
(and costs) for the EU, United States, and third countries. Econometric results point
to an approximate 80% growth in bilateral trade with an ambitious trade agree-
ment. However, at the same time, computable general equilibrium (CGE) estimates
highlight distributional impacts across countries and factors not evident from econo-
metrics alone. Translated through our CGE framework, while bilateral trade in-
creases roughly 80%, there is a fall of about 2.5% in trade with the rest of the
world in our central case. The estimated gains in annual consumption range between
1% and 2.25% for the United States and EU, respectively. A purely discrimina-
tory agreement would harm most countries outside the agreement, while the direction
of third-country effects hinges critically on whether NTB reductions end up being
discriminatory or not. Within the United States and EU, while labour gains across
skill categories, the impact on farmers is mixed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Trade policy research has long treated large-scale liberalization exercises as a focus of in-
terest.1 Whether multilateral negotiations or preferential trade agreements (PTAs), the
main instrument involved was the tariff. Not only were tariff schedules relatively easy to
negotiate, they were relatively easy to analyse quantitatively (the former fact at least in
part a function of the latter). The success of the GATT/WTO process in cutting tariffs
produced negotiating rounds that lasted longer and were considerably more fraught as
remaining tariffs were more deeply embedded in domestic political structures and, at
1 By the early 1980s, computational general equilibrium methods had developed to the point where they
could be usefully applied to the prospective evaluation of the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations (e.g.
Baldwin et al., 1980; Brown and Whalley, 1980; Deardorff and Stern, 1981; Dixon et al., 1984). Since
then, virtually every contemplated trade policy change of any magnitude has seen evaluation using com-
putational general equilibrium methods, from NAFTA to the Uruguay Round to the current discussion
of TTIP.
The Managing Editor in charge of this paper was Thorsten Beck.
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least for the industrial countries that had been most successful in reducing tariffs, the focus
turned increasingly to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade (some of which were still border
barriers, but many of which are rooted in domestic regulatory commitments). With the
apparent failure of the Doha round, there has been an increasing emphasis on negotiating
PTAs involving extensive commitments on non-tariff, as well as tariff, barriers. Thus,
PTAs differ not only in the so-called preference margins they grant (in terms of the num-
ber of products covered and the depth of cuts in applied rates) but also the commitments
on issues beyond tariffs. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the rapid increase in the number of
PTAs (Figure 1a), and the rapid increase in the depth of such agreements (Figure 1b).2
The difficulty with providing a systematic analysis of such deep agreements (as well as
with negotiating them) is that most of the objects of negotiation cannot be directly repre-
sented as a policy-induced, tariff-like, ad-valorem price-wedge. Since tariffs simply gen-
erate a wedge between domestic prices and the world price that can be analysed in a
relatively straightforward manner with well-established methods, NTBs work differently
through, e.g. labelling rules, differential application of competition policy, or uncertain-
ties associated with implementation of administered protection. In this paper, we present
a method for estimating magnitudes of actionable trade costs in terms of their ad valorem
equivalents (AVEs), covering both tariff and NTBs to trade. That is, we provide esti-
mates of ad valorem tariffs that would have the same effects as NTBs. With those in hand,
we are able to evaluate the effects of a PTA involving a substantial reduction of such
costs using standard computational general equilibrium methods.
This approach rests on three pillars. First, in addition to measures of tariffs, we esti-
mate levels of non-tariff, policy and natural trade costs by way of a so-called gravity
model of bilateral international trade. This yields the impact of the depth of existing
PTAs on trade volumes. Second, we take these estimates to gauge potential changes in
ad-valorem trade costs associated with the formation of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP). Third, we employ estimated trade cost changes in a
multi-sector, multi-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to quantify
the associated responses of key economic indicators across TTIP participants and out-
sider (third) countries. Our analysis leads us to conclude that responses to the formation
of TTIP by the insider countries will be modest but not insignificant: about 0.9% in real
consumption for the United States and about 2.1% for the EU as a whole with goods
liberalization. Services liberalization adds slightly, but likelihood of services liberalization
is weak, based on past agreements. Effects on nonmembers tend to be negative and in
the same ballpark, with the direction of third-county effects hinging critically on whether
NTB reductions end up being discriminatory or not.
In the next section we briefly describe TTIP. Section 3 presents our approach to esti-
mating trade costs and gauging the scope for reduction in those costs. Section 4 presents
2 These figures are both from Du¨r et al. (2014): Our Figure 1a is Figure 1 of that article, our Figure 1b is
Figure 5. We will be using the depth index later in our analysis.
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an analysis of the welfare effects of TTIP that would be associated with the aforemen-
tioned trade-cost reductions in the proposed computational model. By way of a conclu-
sion, Section 5 provides a discussion of the political economy of deep PTAs.
2. THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
While a North Atlantic free trade area (FTA) has been suggested for some time (see, e.g.
Baldwin and Francois, 1997), the combination of minimal progress on the Doha round
with the major recession and collapse of international trade associated with the 2007–8
financial crisis has increased interest in a major trade agreement between the EU and
the United States. According to the online edition of Der Spiegel, well before the emer-
gence of the financial crisis, Chancellor Merkel explicitly suggested a US–EU agreement
as a backup in case the Doha round fails (Spiegel, 2006). This was consistent with both
EU and US policy of seeking bilateral PTAs, usually with extensive non-tariff commit-
ments. Thus, faced with continuing lack of progress in the Doha round, and ongoing re-
cession in the United States, President Obama announced that the United States and
EU would commence talks on a “comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership” in his 2013 State of the Union Address. The talks have proceeded through
seven rounds, alternating between Brussels and Washington, beginning in July 2013
with the most recent round at the end of September 2014.
The attraction of such an agreement seems obvious, in part, simply because of the
magnitudes involved. From Table 1, in 2011, together the two TTIP partners ac-
counted for 46% of global GDP and almost 60% of world trade. Yet most of this trade
is not actually transatlantic trade. Rather, despite their collective shares of world produc-
tion and trade, trade flows between the two blocks are relatively low compared with
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
0
100
200
300
400
Cu
m
u
la
tiv
e
 
n
u
m
be
r o
f P
TA
s 
in
 fo
rc
e
0
10
20
30
40
Ag
re
em
en
ts
 s
ig
ne
d 
by
 
ye
a
r
A B
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
19
45
19
49
19
50
19
54
19
55
19
59
19
60
19
64
19
65
19
69
19
70
19
74
19
75
19
79
19
80
19
84
19
85
19
89
19
90
19
94
19
95
19
99
20
00
20
04
20
05
20
09
M
ea
n
Figure 1. (A) PTAs over time; (B) depth of FTAs over time, depth indexed 0–7.
Note: In Graph A vertical bars represent annual totals, and lines represent cumulative totals. In Graph B vertical
bars indicate standard deviations.
Source: Du¨r et al. (2014).
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their trade with other regions. This is again illustrated in the data in Table 1, but per-
haps better visualized with Figure 2. Focusing first on directions of trade, the United
States has far more trade with Asia than it does with Europe. Asia counts for almost
60% of US exports and imports. Similarly, the region accounts for roughly 39% of EU
exports and imports. Other upper and middle-income countries (Canada and Mexico
primarily for the United States, and EFTA and the Euro-Med economies for the EU)
account for most of the remaining trade.
To appreciate the context of TTIP, both for the EU and United States, but also for
third countries, it is also useful to focus on trade intensity, reported in Figure 2 as trade
scaled by partner GDP. For example, EU and US trade with the world is valued at
roughly 13% of global GDP. This means that for each $100 billion in global income,
we see $13.3 billion in trade involving the EU and/or the United States. In the case of
Table 1. GDP and Trade Orientation, 2011
United States EU EU and
United States
EU–US GDP
Billion dollars 14,991 17,645 32,636
Share of world GDP 21.3 25.1 46.3
Trade with world
Billion dollars 4,096 5,036 8,241
Share of world trade 29.4 36.2 59.3
Share of own GDP 27.3 28.5 25.3
Share of world GDP 5.8 7.2 13.0
Trade between EU and United States
Billion dollars 891 891 891
Share of own GDP 5.9 5.0 2.7
Share of partner GDP 5.0 5.9 2.7
Share of world trade 6.4 6.4 6.4
Share of own trade 21.7 17.7 10.8
Trade with Asia, Paciﬁc
Billion dollars 2,443 1,945 4,388
Share of own GDP 16.3 11.0 13.4
Share of partner GDP 9.9 7.7 17.6
Share of world trade 17.6 14.0 31.5
Share of own trade 59.6 38.6 53.2
Trade with other upper and middle-income countries
Billion dollars 740 2,142 2,882
Share of own GDP 4.9 12.1 8.8
Share of partner GDP 5.9 17.0 22.8
Share of world trade 5.3 15.4 20.7
Share of own trade 18.1 42.5 35.0
Trade with low-income countries
Billion dollars 22 58 80
Share of own GDP 0.1 0.3 0.2
Share of partner GDP 5.0 13.3 18.3
Share of world trade 0.2 0.4 0.6
Share of own trade 0.5 1.2 1.0
Note: Trade excludes intra-EU ﬂows.
Sources: IMF, COMTRADE, GTAP9.
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Asia, for every $100 billion in GDP, there is $9.9 billion in trade (exports and imports)
with the United States, and $7.6 billion in trade with the EU. Asian trade with the EU
and United States combined is therefore worth 17.6% of Asian GDP.3 Stark asymme-
tries are evident, especially with low-income countries. For the latter, while trade with
the United States and EU is worth 18.3% of their GDP, it is worth roughly 0.2% of EU
and US GDP.
Viewed in this context, though the EU and the United States account for high shares
of GDP and trade, in a sense the flows between them seem relatively low. For example,
while in Asia each $100 billion in exports is associated with $17.6 billion in trade with
the EU and/or the United States, a similar figure for the EU and United States them-
selves tells us that for each $100 billion in transatlantic GDP, we see only $2.7 billion in
trade in goods and services. In other words, scaled by GDP, the EU and United States
both have much more intense trade relationships with other countries and regions than
they do with each other. Much of this is may be explained by economic structure. Both
economies are mature, with high GDP shares derived from services: 75% of the EU
value added is in services; 82.3% of US value added is in services. As services are less
Figure 2. Composition of trade by destination
Note: Trade excludes intra-EU ﬂows.
Sources: IMF, COMTRADE, GTAP9.
3 We are fully aware that scaling trade by GDP is not the same thing as quantifying the impact on GDP.
It does however provide a useful metric for comparison.
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traded, this helps explain the lower bilateral flows. Such factors should be controlled for
when we turn to gravity modelling, as otherwise we may mislead ourselves into thinking
low trade intensity means high trade barriers. Yet even controlling for such factors, at
this stage we should already note the sense reflected in the negotiating mandate that
transatlantic trade underperforms. The logic is that with shifts in technology and organi-
zation of production towards more global and regional value chains that cross interna-
tional borders, behind the border issues whose trade cost impacts were once second or
third order are increasingly important. Without necessarily changing policy, what were
once domestic regulatory issues have emerged as potential sources of NTB-related trade
costs in a world of international production and associated returns to scale. To some ex-
tent, the United States has dealt with these changes in NAFTA with respect to its North
American partners (especially for motor vehicles). The same holds for Europe in the
context of the EU single market. The TTIP is approached with the combined NAFTA
and EU single market experience helping to frame the current negotiations on regula-
tory divergence and mutual recognition of standards.
This raises an interesting question: Is the relatively modest trade between the United
States and the EU, i.e. relative to their trade with the rest of the world, a function of eco-
nomic fundamentals or policy-induced distortions? Even in the case of tariffs, it would
appear that there are still non-trivial gains to be had from liberalization (see Figure 3).
However, the real gains are expected to be in the reduction of NTBs. Among the areas
both parties agree are negotiating priorities are: Public procurement; rules of origin;
administration of administered protection (e.g. antidumping and countervailing duty);
and trade in services.4 In addition to these areas, there is considerable interest in
regulatory harmonization in technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosani-
tary (SPS) restrictions, intellectual property (including geographical indications), and
financial regulation.5 As with any negotiation, it will be easier to reach agreement
on some of these issues than others. A recent survey of stakeholders by the Atlantic
Council and the Bertelsmann Foundation (Barker and Workman, 2013) summarized
their results on prospects for these different objectives that we reproduce as Figure 4.
Since our goal is to develop estimates of the gains to be had from such a liberalization,
we will need estimates of the trade costs induced by NTBs in a form that will permit
analysis similar to that of tariff costs. That is, we seek estimates of what is broadly achiev-
able and then what is more plausibly actionable. We describe our approach in the next
section.
4 Succinct summaries of negotiating objective can be found: for the United States at http://www.ustr.
gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/March/US-Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-T-TIP-a-
Detailed-View; and for the EU at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152699.
pdf.
5 This reflects growing belief, and some evidence, that harmonization may reduce trade costs substan-
tially. See for example Reyes (2011).
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3. QUANTIFYING THE SCOPE FOR TRADE-COST REDUCTIONS IN TTIP
We turn next to quantifying possible trade-cost reductions under TTIP. For tariffs this is
relatively straightforward. For NTBs, on the other hand, it is less so. Therefore, we start
with the easier task of describing tariffs, then move on to estimates of NTB reductions
for goods in past PTAs, and, in particular, to estimates specific to the EU–US context.
We save the most speculative for last – quantifying NTB reductions for services.
Figure 4. Importance vs difﬁculty of policy challenges for negotiators
Figure 3. Applied (MFN) tariffs on transatlantic trade
Note: Values reported are for 2011 and are trade-weighted.
Source: WTO integrated database and the World Bank/UNCTADWITS database.
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3.1. Tariffs
For a quantification of tariff changes associated with TTIP, we have to assess (weighted)
levels of tariff barriers for each goods sector in a first step. The maximum tariff margin
that could be granted through TTIP reciprocally between the EU and the United States
is the weighted sector-level applied tariff for non-PTA members charged on imports by
the EU and the United States.6 We employ this margin in the quantitative analysis as
an estimate of the tariff preferences extended to members of TTIP.
Although both US and EU average (MFN and applied) tariffs are similar, there is het-
erogeneity when we break down tariff protection by sector. From Figure 3, the most
striking cases are motor vehicles and processed foods. The EU tariffs on these products
are substantially higher than corresponding US tariffs, and indeed far higher than the
trade-weighted average MFN tariff for goods overall. For motor vehicles,7 the EU
applies an average tariff (7.9%) that is over seven times higher than the one of the
United States. For processed food products, EU average tariffs (15.8%) are more than
three times higher than US average tariffs. Although primary agriculture appears rela-
tively open, this is misleading. Protection in this sector takes the form of a wide variety
of NTBs, as will be seen in the next subsection.
3.2. NTBs on goods
We now turn to the trickier question of possible trade-cost reductions linked to NTBs to
goods transactions. As noted above, cost-savings may follow from such things as cross
recognition of standards (a process where industry plays a central role) to acceptance of
regulations (a process where regulators need to find common ground and essentially
trust the approach taken by comparable agencies on the opposite side of the pond) or
even to joint regulation and development of joint standards. None of this can be consid-
ered as easy. While examples such as “run drug trials once and not twice” might seem
obvious places to start, as we discuss in the conclusion, differences in the social/political
approach to risk and consumer protection render even the obvious into something more
complex and murky.8
One place to look, in terms of estimating possible reductions in NTBs to goods trans-
actions through TTIP, is the magnitude of NTB reductions through PTAs in the past.
The EU itself, for example, has been engaged in a decades long exercise of reducing
NTBs not unlike the goals stated for TTIP. We have also seen other PTAs, ranging
from shallow tariff-only FTAs to relatively deep and comprehensive agreements, such as
6 Notice that, in the absence of a current trade agreement between the EU and the United States, the ap-
plied tariff rate is the same as the MFN, or “bound”, rate for both the EU and the United States.
7 The motor vehicles sector includes also parts and components.
8 We invite the reader to look through firm survey responses to regulation in the ECORYS (2009) annex
material, “Annex VI Business survey results”, which provides examples on an industry basis of sources of
cost differences when the same firms operate in multiple regulatory regimes.
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the NAFTA. The NTB reductions associated with those earlier agreements may provide
some guidance as to what one might expect from TTIP, if it ends up looking like the
deeper end of existing PTAs.
In formal terms, NTB reductions to goods transactions associated with PTA member-
ship can be estimated as follows. We may specify a gravity model of bilateral trade,
where we model bilateral trade flows as a function of (exporter- and importer-) country-
specific fixed effects, a set of bilateral (geographical, cultural, historical, etc.) non-policy
barriers to goods trade, the log tariff margin granted by a country-pair (not necessarily
only within PTAs), and PTA depth measures. Of these three policy measures, only the
latter two pertain to economic policy, and the NTB effect of trade agreements corre-
sponds to the joint impact of PTAs (or FTAs) conditional on tariffs and the depth of
PTAs. Hence, NTB effects of PTAs must be associated with and can be estimated as ef-
fects beyond tariff reductions (see Egger and Larch, 2011).
In order to estimate AVE measures of PTA-induced NTB reductions, we estimate a
gravity model of bilateral goods trade on a cross-section of data for the year 2011 for
each sector, using the same level of aggregation as in the computational model, and com-
parable to earlier ECORYS (2009) aggregates.9 Bilateral sector-level trade flows are
modelled as an exponential function of a log-linear index of five ingredients: exporter-
specific factors (measuring the supply potential of exporting countries), importer-specific
factors (measuring the demand potential of importing countries), and the aforementioned
three classes of bilateral factors (measuring “natural” or non-policy trade impediments in
a broad sense, tariff impediments, and NTBs). We estimate exporter-specific and
importer-specific factors as country fixed effects and parametrize bilateral factors in the
log-linear index as a function of observable country-pair-specific variables. Estimating the
model for each sector separately ensures that (i) neither trade (or demand or substitution
or Armington) elasticities are forced to be the same across sectors (see Broda and
Weinstein (2006) for evidence of a substantial variability of those across sectors; see Egger
et al. (2012) for evidence of the variability of trade elasticities between goods and ser-
vices), and (ii) that NTBs are permitted to vary across sectors (see Cadot and Malouche,
2012; ECORYS, 2009, for evidence of substantial variability of NTBs across sectors).
The explanatory variables used in the gravity equations are summarized in Table 2.
We parametrize non-policy barriers to goods trade in logs as a linear function of log
bilateral shipping distances, common border, common language, and former colonial
ties. We also include a measure of political distance based on measures from the political
science literature (polity).10
9 A mapping from these sectors for NACE is provided in the online Annex.
10 Shipping distances are based on actual shipping routes (Bekkers et al., 2015), other natural geo-
historical trade-cost measures are from the CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011), and polity
comes from the Quality of Governance expert survey dataset (Dahlstro¨m et al., 2011). We use the pair-
wise similarity of polity, reflecting evidence that homophily is important in explaining direct (economic
and) political linkages (De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011).
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For measuring tariff barriers, we include the bilateral tariff margin granted in free
trade agreements. This margin is measured as the difference between the most favoured
nation (MFN) rate, which is subsumed under the importer-specific fixed effect, and the
rate used by a specific trade partner. This measure actually represents the negative of
the preference margin.
In order to estimate the extent of NTB reductions associated with PTAs conditional
on natural (non-policy) and tariff barriers, we include two variables – a binary indicator
variable for intra-EU relationships and an integer-valued variable for depth of non-EU
PTAs based on data from Du¨r et al. (2014) – called DESTA. This depth-of-trade agree-
ment variable takes on integer values ranging between unity for shallow agreements and
seven for deep agreements. Estimating a separate parameter on an EU membership in-
dicator variable permits a special status of EU membership among all considered PTAs.
It differentiates between the legal and institutional harmonization associated with EU
membership, which clearly goes beyond the liberalization of policies in other PTAs.
Table 3 summarizes the relevant trade-cost-function parameters of the gravity model
regressions. In those regressions, we treat FTA (or, more generally, PTA) membership
and depth of FTAs as endogenous (choice) variables in a control-function approach.
The approach is outlined in more detail in the Appendix and so are the first-stage (pro-
bit) regressions which are used to estimate the control-function terms (see Egger et al.
2011).11 Across all regressions presented in the table, the explanatory power – measured
by the correlation coefficient between the model and the data, dubbed the pseudo-R2 –
is generally quite high (exceptions being primary/food sectors). The results suggest that
Table 2. Explanatory variables used in gravity modelling
Name Description
ln(1þ tariff) Log of the tariff (preference margin vis-a`-vis MFN)
ln(distance) Log of shipping distance in kilometres
Polity index Index of political similarity (democratic institutions)
Common colony Dummy for shared colonial history
Common language Dummy for shared common ethnic language
Contiguous Dummy for common border
Colony Dummy for former colonial relationship
EU Dummy for intra-EU trade
FTA depth Ranges from 1 to 7 based on DESTA scores
11 From a general perspective, such an approach relies on some instrumental variables that help splitting
the variation in an endogenous variable – e.g. the integer-valued depth-of-agreement measure – into
two components: One that contains exogenous variation only and one that contains also endogenous
variation. In the present analysis, we assume joint normality of the endogenous variables and we base
the control function on generalized Mills’ ratios that are obtained from an ordered probit model of
depth-of-trade agreements. Since intra-EU relationships are associated with a depth measure of 7, and
tariff margins granted in agreements are correlated with the depth of agreements, a flexible function of
depth-integer-specific Mills’ ratios is capable of controlling for the endogeneity of all trade policy mea-
sured included in the analysis.
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Table 3. Second stage gravity-based coefﬁcient estimates
All goods Primary food Energy Processed food
ln(1þ tariff) 4.743 7.159 7.947 3.795
(2.87)*** (2.99)*** (2.26)** (2.85)***
ln(distance) 0.78 0.753 0.988 0.796
(20.36)*** (10.94)*** (12.48)*** (16.63)***
Polity index 0.37 0.25 0.716 0.247
(2.48)** (0.96) (1.62)a (1.07)
Common colony 0.32 0.458 0.066 0.49
(2.13)** (1.72)* (0.24) (2.46)**
Common language 0.467 0.679 0.504 0.714
(5.67)*** (5.39)*** (3.09)*** (7.19)***
Common border 0.497 0.56 0.565 0.58
(5.10)*** (4.06)*** (3.09)*** (5.03)***
Former colony 0.626 0.347 0.839 0.735
(5.48)*** (1.66)* (4.04)*** (5.44)***
European Union 0.575 1.61 0.001 1.499
(4.54)*** (6.18)*** (0.00) (7.87)***
FTA depth 0.087 0.15 0.169 0.158
(3.74)*** (3.25)*** (2.90)*** (4.87)***
N 10,721 10,341 4,581 10,539
Pseudo R2 0.8093 0.683 0.594 0.7663
Beverages and
tobacco
Petrochemicals Chemicals,
pharmaceuticals
Metals, fabricated
metals
ln(1þtariff) 4.293 1.907 3.557 3.895
(3.80)*** (0.27) (1.80)* (1.43)§
ln(distance) 0.8 1.172 0.754 0.857
(12.35)*** (14.90)*** (18.30)*** (19.54)***
Polity index 0.956 0.09 0.057 0.302
(2.71)*** (0.25) (0.31) (1.43)a
Common colony 1.012 0.314 0.214 0.215
(3.99)*** (1.29) (1.35) (1.21)
Common language 0.538 0.619 0.398 0.472
(4.09)*** (3.71)*** (4.45)*** (5.19)***
Common border 0.71 0.642 0.593 0.684
(4.91)*** (3.59)*** (5.04)*** (6.69)***
Former colony 0.701 0.496 0.666 0.537
(4.60)*** (2.47)** (5.11)*** (4.95)***
European Union 1.498 0.27 0.889 1.268
(5.16)*** (0.86) (5.90)*** (8.25)***
FTA depth 0.215 0.173 0.11 0.086
(4.57)*** (2.88)*** (3.64)*** (2.93)***
N 9,928 9,646 10,447 10,528
Pseudo R2 0.694 0.6562 0.8095 0.7824
Motor
vehicles
Electrical
machinery
Other
machinery
Other
goods
ln(1þtariff) 7.29 3.563 8.209 8.482
(3.21)*** (0.75) (1.62)a (5.67)***
ln(distance) 0.596 0.648 0.665 0.806
(8.58)*** (9.93)*** (15.41)*** (19.59)***
Polity index 0.042 0.114 0.127 0.711
(0.18) (0.63) (0.72) (3.88)***
(Continued)
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overall, as well as at the sector-level, goods trade (in most sectors) rises (trade costs de-
cline) with a larger preference margin granted in trade agreements with a greater depth
of an agreement, and with EU membership. Note from Table 2 that we have used the
DESTA database to identify PTA depth. The parameter on the (negative) tariff margin
reflects what is referred to as the elasticity of trade with respect to tariffs.12 With refer-
ence to the new trade literature on monopolistic competition and economies of scale, we
would refer to sectors with a larger (smaller) negative value of that elasticity as more
(less) competitive. Accordingly, we would say that the results suggest that the competitive
pressure is particularly high in primary energy production, other machinery, and motor
vehicles.
A deep trade agreement directly benefits (recall that the presented parameters mea-
sure only direct or partial effects) almost all sectors more than a shallow agreement, ex-
cept in motor vehicles and electrical machinery. In the case of the EU and United
States, estimated effects under a deep FTA are limited to fewer sectors: Primary agricul-
ture; processed foods; beverages and tobacco; chemicals and pharmaceuticals; motor ve-
hicles; and other machinery. For all goods, EU membership, with all its provisions that
are directly and indirectly related to goods trade, exhibits a direct semi-elasticity of
0.575, or 100(e0.5751)  78%. On a volume basis, the direct gains from EU integra-
tion are particularly large for: Primary food; processed foods; beverages and tobacco;
chemicals; metals; and motor vehicles.
Table 3. Continued
Motor
vehicles
Electrical
machinery
Other
machinery
Other
goods
Common colony 0.553 0.467 0.489 0.274
(1.75)* (2.22)** (2.14)** (1.89)*
Common language 0.265 0.641 0.418 0.529
(2.12)** (5.55)*** (4.85)*** (5.15)***
Common border 0.807 0.083 0.48 0.702
(5.77)*** (0.57) (4.29)*** (6.33)***
Former colony 0.38 0.782 0.646 0.739
(2.14)** (4.19)*** (5.74)*** (4.94)***
European Union 1.299 0.631 0.133 0.468
(5.89)*** (3.31)*** (0.74) (2.81)***
FTA depth 0.184 0.009 0.071 0.043
(3.82)*** (0.25) (2.51)** (1.42)a
N 10,042 10,233 10,742 10,786
Pseudo R2 0.8302 0.8224 0.8521 0.8311
ap< 0.15; *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01. z-ratios in parentheses. GLM estimates.
12 This is often estimated at being between 3.5 and 7 for aggregate trade flows and varies largely
across sectors. See for example Broda and Weinstein (2006). We estimate the models in share terms
(normalized by importer expenditures) and employ the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) estimator for
logit estimation with structural zeros (see also Baum, 2008).
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Similarly, the direct semi-elasticity associated with shifting from no agreement to a
deep agreement, which is our experiment for TTIP, is 7 0.087¼ 0.609, or
100(e0.6091)  84%. (In the CGE exercise that follows, bilateral trade volumes in-
crease by 78–82% for EU exports to the United States and US exports to the EU.)
Notice that the estimated volume effect for an exporter to the EU of switching from no
agreement at all to a deep agreement with the EU is similar to the estimated EU volume
effect.
Based on the tariff and FTA coefficients in Table 3, we translate the estimated trade
volume effects into trade cost estimates. Table 4 summarizes the AVEs of NTBs in
Columns A and B. To see what these AVEs are, let the generic ad-valorem tariff param-
eter be a and the coefficient on any non-tariff measure be b. Moreover, denote the aver-
age value of any generic non-tariff trade cost by c. Then, the AVE: 100 (ebc/a1)
measures the necessary percentage point adjustment of tariffs that is equivalent to elimi-
nating the respective NTB cost. In the table, the trade cost indicator c is either EU
Membership or a deep trade agreement with the EU or the United States. In essence
the term bc is the trade volume effect, and dividing it by the tariff coefficient gives the
comparable tariff rate that would yield the same volume effect. In Table 4 we have com-
puted two tariff-equivalents, one for cost-savings from EU membership (i.e. the deepest
Table 4. AVE estimates for NTB reductions
A B C D E
Intra-EU
AVE savings
Deep ECORYS
(2009)
ECORYS
(2009)
Share
of
bilateral
trade
EU–US
RTA AVE
savings
AVEs AVEs
EU versus
United
States
United
States
versus EU
Goods 12.89 13.7 na na 70.6
[7.13 to 18.95] [6.3 to 21.61]
Primary agriculture 25.22 15.8 na na 0.6
[16.6 to 34.48] [5.99 to 26.51]
Primary energy 0.01 16.05 na na 0.6
[27.95 to 31.11] [4.94 to 28.33]
Processed foods 48.44 33.83 25.4 25.4 5.4
[34.53 to 63.78] [19.02 to 50.49]
Beverages and tobacco 41.76 41.99 25.4 25.4 1.3
[24.16 to 61.85] [22.17 to 65.02]
Petrochemicals 7.89 24.17 na na 1.5
[9.25 to 28.26] [7.16 to 43.88]
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 20.62 29.09 10.2 11.4 19.1
[13.33 to 28.36] [12.51 to 48.11]
Metals, fabricated metals 38.48 16.71 5.3 9 4.1
[28.17 to 49.61] [5.25 to 29.43]
Motor vehicles 19.51 19.32 14 14.2 5.7
[12.63 to 26.81] [8.98 to 30.65]
Electrical machinery 19.37 1.78 6 6.8 3.0
[7.49 to 32.57] [11.39 to 16.92]
Other machinery 1.63 6.24 0 0 23.5
[2.64 to 6.09] [1.34 to 11.38]
Other manufactures 5.67 3.61 na na 5.8
[1.68 to 9.82] [1.34 to 8.81]
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trade agreement in our sample) and one for estimated cost reductions following from
the deepest observed FTAs.13 The results suggest that the tariff-equivalent effects of in-
tra-EU (non-tariff) preferences are largest for primary agriculture and processed foods;
beverages and tobacco; chemicals; metals; and motor vehicles. For the most part, intra-
EU cost-savings are (sometimes much) higher than under deep FTAs. As evidenced by
the difference between the two columns, if barriers are not removed in an FTA, then we
will not observe cost reductions, even if there are actually substantial underlying barriers.
In other words, just because we do not see volume effects in FTAs does not mean that
NTBs are not there. Nor can we assume that deep FTAs achieve the full range of poten-
tial cost reductions.
Columns C and D in Table 4 provide another basis for analysis. These are from the
ECORYS (2009) study of transatlantic NTBs. Those estimates are also gravity based,
from a similar estimation framework to the one reported in Table 3. The critical differ-
ence is that the estimates in Columns C and D are based on firm survey-based pairwise
rankings of market access conditions across markets (scored 0–100). On that basis, relative
access conditions were found to vary systematically for intra-EU versus extra-EU trade
(meaning EU trade with third countries). Converting those volume effects into trade cost
equivalents, and applying additional information from the firm responses (the share of to-
tal NTB-related costs that could realistically be removed by a mix of cross recognition
and regulatory convergence) yields the results summarized in Columns C and D.
Essentially, Columns A and B are estimates of what has been accomplished in existing
trade agreements. Columns C and D, following a similar methodology, focus instead on
possible cost-savings in the transatlantic context. For most sectors where we have available
estimates in the second set of columns, the estimates are generally quite similar, especially
if we focus on the intra-EU estimates as a benchmark. Interestingly, though tariffs on pri-
mary agriculture were shown above to be relatively low, from the estimates in Table 4 the
impact of NTBs on this set of goods is actually quite dramatic. In addition, there is clear
evidence of substantial cost-savings in the context of both deep PTAs and the EU itself.
3.3. NTBs on services
Finally, we now turn to services. This is a difficult area both in PTAs and in the WTO,
where services are covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services, aka the
GATS. (see Francois and Hoekman (2010) for a general discussion of measurement
problems). Fortunately, new sets of data have been released based on relatively detailed
analysis of regulatory regimes in services, combined with assessments of how GATS and
PTA commitments in services compared with policies actually in place. We will work in
this section with estimates of trade restrictions in services from the World Bank
13 For petrochemicals we use the (significant) estimated trade elasticitiy for all goods.
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(Borchert et al., 2014), AVEs for trade barriers in services based on the World Bank
data (Jafari and Tarr, 2015), and assessments of GATS bindings and how these compare
to PTA services commitments from the WTO (Roy, 2014). Hence, in contrast to the
previous subsection, where we estimated AVEs of NTBs to goods transactions ourselves,
we employ AVEs of NTBs to services transactions from other sources listed above.
Table 5 provides summary information for services for the EU and the United States.
The first two columns provide estimated AVEs of market access restrictions in services
on the basis of the World Bank’s STRI database (Jafari and Tarr, 2015) and are compa-
rable to estimates from other sources. They represent actual levels of market access.
These pertain to trade in services in a traditional sense. The numbers are AVEs on
cross-border trade in services. Such trade may require establishments abroad. Indeed
the World Bank’s STRI database includes both restrictions on setting up foreign estab-
lishments and direct restrictions on cross-border trade (modes 1 and 3; see Francois and
Hoekman 2010). Essentially, the trade cost estimates in the table pertain to how the
combination of mode 1 and 3 restrictions map into cross-border trade. Also working
with the World Bank’s STRI data, van der Marel and Shepherd (2013) conclude that
there is substantial heterogeneity in regulations and so in their impact on services trade.
Columns C and D provide a different perspective. These provide scores from 0 to 100,
where 0 means no binding commitments have been made and 100 means full commit-
ments have been made to bind policies linked to market access for particular sectors.
From Columns C and D, many sectors are relatively unbound both in the GATS, but
also in terms of the deepest commitments made by either the EU or the United States
within PTAs. There are exceptions, such as the distribution sector, construction, and
communications. Yet from Columns A and B these sectors are relatively open anyway.
A similar message is provided by Borchert et al. (2011), who note that in general GATS
Table 5. AVEs and market access in services
A B C D E
AVEs of current policies GATS, and best RTA Share
ofbilateral
tradeEU United States EU United States
Services 12.79 12.94 55.3, 64.4 55.4, 55.4 29.4
Construction na na 70.8, 83.3 83.3, 83.3 0.4
Air transport 25.00 11.00 66.3, 72.5 5.0, 28.8 3.1
Maritime 1.71 13.00 47.6, 63.1 0.0, 44 0.1
Other transport 29.73 0.00 57.1, 71.4 42.9, 64.3 3.1
Distribution 1.40 0.00 71.9, 87.5 100, 100 1.0
Communications 1.10 3.50 75.0, 78.1 78.3, 78.3 1.1
Banking 1.45 17.00 42.7, 42.7 29.2, 33.3 5.0
Insurance 6.55 17.00 57.5, 57.5 40.0, 50.0 2.7
Professional and business 35.43 42.00 58.8, 62.5 57.5, 62.5 8.1
Personal, recreational na na 47.6, 50.9 91.5, 91.5 1.3
Public services na na 32.5, 36.7 19.2, 31.7 3.5
Source: WTO and World Bank. See text.
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commitments provide little in terms of binding commitments relative to actual policy.
Where we see the highest protection in Table 5, in professional and business services,
both the EU and United States are highly protective, and they are reticent to make ac-
tual commitments in these sectors. Yet, from Column E, business and professional ser-
vices are the single most important set of services, in terms of transatlantic trade. As
such, while we see little evidence of actual liberalization under the GATS or PTAs, there
is great potential given the size of barriers (the AVEs in Columns A and B) and the ser-
vices trade shares (Column E). On the US side, other standouts are banking and insur-
ance (high barriers, little evidence of actual binding commitments) and maritime
services (same story).
How do we interpret the data in Table 5? Based on past experience, neither the
United States nor the EU has shown a willingness to make binding commitments to
open service sectors where protection actually matters. This does not mean we cannot
speculate on a situation where we depart from past behavior. However, this means we
will be embarking on numerical speculation, even more so than usual, when projecting
services NTB cost reductions in our numerical modelling.
4. A NUMERICAL MODEL OF TTIP
4.1. Overview of the model
We utilize a computational model that belongs to a class of models known as CGE mod-
els.14 There is a single representative or composite household in each region. Household
income is allocated to government, personal consumption, and savings. In each region
the composite household owns endowments of the factors of production and receives in-
come by selling the services of these factors to firms. It also receives income from tariff
revenue and rents accruing from import/export quota licenses. Part of the income is dis-
tributed as subsidy payments to some sectors, primarily in agriculture.
Taxes are included at several levels in the model. Production taxes are placed on in-
termediate or primary inputs, or on output. Tariffs are levied at the border. Additional
internal taxes are placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be ap-
plied at differential rates that discriminate against imports. Where relevant, taxes are
also placed on exports, and on primary factor income. Finally, where relevant
14 There are strong similarities to the recent class of structurally estimated general equilibrium models (see
Arkolakis et al. (2012) for an overview). However, unlike some of these models (e.g. Eaton and Kortum,
2002; Helpman et al., 2008), we do not assume that all observed deviations in actual trade from pre-
dicted trade (not explained by pairwise distance or by size of markets) results from unobserved trade
costs (for more discussion on these points, see De Melo and Tarr, 1992; Francois and Shiells, 1994;
Hertel, 1997, 2013; Francois et al., 2013). We might consider most structurally estimated and then sim-
ulated trade models as nothing else than overly simplistic CGE models relative to what had been done
in multi-country large-open-economy CGE modelling in the last two decades.
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(as indicated by social accounting data) taxes are placed on final consumption, and can
be applied differentially to consumption of domestic and imported goods.
On the production side, in all sectors, firms employ domestic production factors
(capital, labour, and land) and intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources to
produce outputs in the most cost-efficient way that technology allows. In some sectors,
perfect competition is assumed, with products from different regions modelled as imper-
fect substitutes based on CES preferences (known as the Armington assumption).
Manufacturing and business services are modelled with monopolistic competition.
Monopolistic competition involves scale economies that are internal to each firm, de-
pending on its own production level. An important property of the monopolistic compe-
tition model is that increased specialization at intermediate stages of production yields
returns due to specialization, where the sector as a whole becomes more productive the
broader the range of specialized inputs. In models of this type, part of the impact of pol-
icy changes in final consumption follows from changes in available choices (the variety
of goods they can choose from). Similarly firms are affected by changes in available
choices (varieties) of intermediate inputs. Changes in available varieties also involve
changes in available foreign varieties, in addition to domestic ones. As a result, changes
in consumer and firm input choices will “spill-over” between countries as they trade
with each other.15 Finally, the model also includes a medium-term closure, meaning
that capital stocks are linked to underlying equilibrium levels of investment.16
The model calibration is based on data that are collected in the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP) database. Tariffs and tariff revenues are explicit in that data-
base and, therefore, can be directly incorporated into the model used here. However,
NTBs affecting goods and services trade, as well as cost-savings linked to trade facilita-
tion, are not explicit in the database and we need to incorporate those as AVEs as ob-
tained from the estimates as outlined in Section 3.17 In formal terms, most NTBs affect
the efficiency of production for sale in specific markets. Where NTBs instead involve
higher prices because of rents, we model this as additional mark-ups (higher prices) ac-
cruing to firms. A reduction of NTBs then involves a surrendering of the associated
rents. From firm and regulator surveys (see ECORYS 2009) a good rule of thumb is a
50:50 split of the AVEs for NTBs into market-serving costs and rents.
The closest to our study in terms of methodology and underlying data is CEPR
(2013). The latter uses very similar underlying data and methodology in its estimates
and reports real income changes in its Annex.
15 Critically, when we move from one to many sectors with general equilibrium constraints on overall re-
sources, shifting resources out of some sectors and into others leads to impacts on variety/scale effects
at sector level that we miss in a single-sector model, in the sense that when one sector gains another
loses. See Francois and Nelson (2002) for further discussion on this point.
16 In this sense the model follows the structure in Baldwin et al. (1997) and Francois et al. (2005).
17 The original Francois (1999, 2001) approach to the inclusion of iceberg-type costs in GTAP has be-
come a standard feature of the GTAP model with Hertel et al. (2001).
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4.2. Specifying the experiment
With a computational model in hand, the next step is specifying the policy experiment.
We base these on values in Figure 3 and Tables 4 and 5. For goods, we assume full tariff
elimination. In addition, we use the AVE estimates of reductions of NTBs to goods trade
associated with deep FTAs. As outlined above, the situation is trickier when it comes to
services.
In order to specify a scenario for NTBs on services transactions, we combine two
thoughts. A pessimist might consider it plausible that an agreement will be signed that
includes services but where, as in past agreements, nothing actually happens in terms
of market access conditions for services. This is a view consistent with the pattern of
values reported in Table 5. An optimist might be more inclined to give negotiators the
benefit of the doubt. There is a clearly stated policy objective of improving market
access in services (i.e. “This time will be different”). Yet in some sectors (distribution in
the United States) we already have essentially free trade, and in others we are close
(communications services). We choose to be cautiously optimistic. Based on statements
of negotiators, worries about the maneuvering of financial institutions to undercut regu-
lation through TTIP, and the deep commitments already made under Basel III, we do
not expect real liberalization in finance (banking and insurance) under TTIP even
with an optimistic assessment. However, being cautious optimists, for other sectors
we have opted to include 50% reduction of AVEs from Table 5 for the remaining sec-
tors (excluding finance), reflecting the rough rule of thumb that half of these AVEs might
be eliminated with a real, deep set of commitments on services (meaning half of these
costs are actionable). To reiterate a point made earlier, our AVEs for services reflect
the combined impact of restrictions on all modes of cross-border trade, and we are
not claiming to model variations in liberalization by mode.18 Rather, we model an effec-
tive liberalization across modes sufficient to reduce the overall AVE for cross-border
trade by half.
In what follows we will separate services from goods, so that the more cynical readers
can also focus on a sub-experiment that excludes services liberalization. The trade cost
shocks (the tariffs and tariff-equivalents for NTBs to be eliminated) is summarized in
Table 6.
4.3. Simulated effects from TTIP implementation
Table 7 summarizes our estimates of national income changes, measured as changes in
real household consumption (meaning nominal household incomes by region are
18 The trade negotiators (lawyers) that set up the General Agreement on Trade in Services at the WTO
chose to define trade as including foreign affiliate sales and temporary migrant income as trade. Being
economists, we choose the narrower balance of payments-based definition.
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deflated by changes in prices), under our core TTIP scenario. In the table, we provide a
breakdown along the elements of the scenario (tariffs, goods NTBs, and services NTBs)
and also across regions. Each cell provides a point “estimate” of comparative static ef-
fects that is consistent with the parameter point estimates in Table 4 and with the aver-
age shocks in Table 6. Table 7 also reports “confidence intervals” around these point
“estimates” which are associated with the 95% confidence intervals of the parameters in
Table 4 for goods and, in the absence of parameter estimates, we take zero and thrice
AVE as the boundaries of the range (centered around the midpoint AVE) for services.
(Indeed also for goods, we set a lower bound of zero for goods NTB cost reductions as
well.) The two values in squared brackets and separated by a tilde below the average ef-
fects refer to the range of general-equilibrium-consistent responses pertaining to the as-
sociated range of partial effects.
For both the United States and the EU, the primary action comes from goods liberal-
ization rather than services. This is seen by comparison of Columns D and E. Indeed,
for goods, NTBs dominate by far the benefits of tariff reductions. In our goods only sce-
nario (Column D), the EU gains 2.61% in terms of annual real consumption on average
(with a range of 0.83–3.56), and the United States gains roughly 0.91% on average
Table 6. Midpoint trade-cost reductions in TTIP scenario
AVE % cost reductions Tariffs
EU NTBs US NTBs EU tariffs US tariffs
Goods 13.7 13.7 2.1 1.3
Primary agriculture 15.8 15.8 3.3 2.2
Primary energy 16.1 16.1 0.0 0.1
Processed foods 33.8 33.8 15.8 5.0
Beverages and tobacco 42.0 42.0 5.9 0.8
Petrochemicals 24.2 24.2 1.8 1.6
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 29.1 29.1 2.1 1.3
Metals, fabricated metals 16.7 16.7 1.8 1.2
Motor vehicles 19.3 19.3 7.9 1.1
Electrical machinery 1.8 1.8 0.6 0.3
Other machinery 6.2 6.2 1.2 0.7
Other manufactures 3.6 3.6 1.7 2.9
Services 9.9 6.7
Construction 4.6 2.5
Air transport 12.5 5.5
Maritime 0.9 6.5
Other transport 14.9 0.0
Distribution 0.7 0.0
Communications 0.6 1.8
Banking 0.0 0.0
Insurance 0.0 0.0
Professional and business 17.7 21.0
Personal, recreational 4.4 2.5
Public services * *
Notes: For construction we have started from values reported by ECORYS as the recent World Bank AVE esti-
mates for services do not cover construction. Goods and services aggregates are all trade weighted based on bilat-
eral trade ﬂows.
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(with a range of 0.35–1.68%). Within the EU, we also break out the impact on the
larger EU economies. Here, we see that these larger states gain somewhat less than the
overall EU gains. While Germany gains 1.27 on average, some of the larger Member
States (Spain, France) gain far less than Germany or the United Kingdom. These repre-
sent increases in annual levels of consumption where we have essentially assumed the
agreement had already been in place in 2011. Column F provides a different view. Here
we use a discount function V(F), where we assume a gradual phase in, so that 10% of
the change is realized in year 1, 20% in year 2, etc., and full realization of this change is
realized by year 10. We further assume to start from an economy otherwise like that in
2011, we use a discount rate of 3.5%, and we focus on 20 years of changed real income
changes. On this basis, the projected agreement yields a stream of income gains worth a
lump sum or one-time payment of 24.0% of GDP for the EU, and 10.3% for the
United States. Strikingly, the accumulated costs for third countries, especially for EFTA
members, Turkey, and the Asia-Pacific partners of the United States (the TPP grouping)
is comparable, in terms of accumulated losses, to US gains. What we see, therefore,
from Columns D, E, and F is that a classic, fully discriminatory approach to TTIP could
potentially be very costly for third countries. The patterns across countries hinge on the
trade and production structures and underlying NTBs.19
There are expectations of possible trade-cost reductions for third countries from
TTIP. They are collectively referred to as “regulatory convergence spillovers” or “NTB
reduction spillovers.” Indeed, if the United States and the EU launch a process of regu-
latory streamlining and mutual recognition, and if this process proves to be relatively
non-discriminatory, there may be ancillary benefits to third countries. This means, for
example, that Turkey might find it somewhat easier to access the US market if the EU
and US rules and standards move closer together and/or are streamlined due to TTIP.
In effect, it may become easier to access the combined EU–US market, in terms of regu-
latory barriers, than it was for the two distinct markets. Apart from informal discussion
with industry and negotiators, where firms do seem to believe such potential benefits are
lurking in the shadows, we have little basis for knowing exactly how large such spillovers
might be (or even if they will be realized). Even so, in Table 8 we report estimated im-
pacts of such spillovers, defined as improved market access for third countries exporting
to the EU and United States. What we have done, starting from the results reported in
Table 8 is to further assume that 20% of the NTB cost reductions realized by US firms
accessing the EU, and EU firms accessing the United States, also accrue to third coun-
tries (e.g. Japan) accessing those same EU and US markets.
A comparison of Column F in Table 7 with Column I in Table 8 illustrates a rela-
tively important point. The form that mutual recognition of standards and regulatory
19 The online Annex material includes tables with mappings between bilateral trade patterns and the
NTBs included in out experiment definitions in Table 6. It also includes tables on the value-added com-
position of transatlantic trade.
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cooperation might take under TTIP is rather central to the whole affair. With some
NTB harmonization between the EU and United States leading to an effective reduc-
tion in costs for third countries, benefits might, potentially, then be expected for third
countries, especially for upper and middle-income countries. This is one possible negoti-
ation path that, if followed, also yields the highest gains for the United States and EU.
However, it certainly is not the only path possible, and indeed a more protectionist ap-
proach might be more responsive to lobbying interests and hence more likely. Under
such an alternative approach, if the solution for a negotiated reduction of differences in
regulatory systems is to establish some sort of deliberately discriminatory country of
Table 8. Income effects from spillovers
F G H¼Eþ FþG I¼V(H)
Spillovers to
high income
Spillovers to
middle and low
income
Total inclusive
of spillovers
Discounted total
as present value
United States 0.01 0.15 1.13 11.93
[0.01 to 0.14] [0.05 to 0.18] [0.39 to 2.12] [4.15 to 22.48]
European Union 0.14 0.56 2.97 31.41
[0 to 0.3] [0.21 to 0.77] [1.03 to 5.12] [10.94 to 54.22]
of which
Germany 0.53 0.36 2.32 24.57
[0.24 to 0.71] [0.12 to 0.54] [0.83 to 4.08] [8.78 to 43.25]
France 0.03 0.52 1.88 19.9
[0.06 to 0.14] [0.18 to 0.79] [0.54 to 3.48] [5.75 to 36.86]
United Kingdom 0.1 0.3 2.22 23.57
[0.01 to 0.18] [0.11 to 0.45] [0.78 to 3.9] [8.24 to 41.27]
Italy 0.06 0.71 2.23 23.63
[0.05 to 0.18] [0.28 to 1.07] [0.71 to 4.03] [7.5 to 42.73]
Spain 0.08 0.54 1.37 14.51
[0 to 0.11] [0.22 to 0.78] [0.34 to 2.59] [3.59 to 27.48]
EFTA 3.39 0.25 0.56 5.89
[2.06 to 3.97] [0.12 to 0.47] [0.43 to 0.63] [4.51 to 6.66]
Turkey 2.74 0.19 1.8 19.09
[1.27 to 4.22] [0.04 to 0.44] [0.9 to 2.55] [9.53 to 27.02]
Other Europe 0.45 0.13 0.15 1.61
[0.15 to 0.71] [0.04 to 0.21] [0.04 to 0.24] [0.43 to 2.52]
Mediterranean 0.21 0.51 0.08 0.84
[0.08 to 0.28] [0.17 to 0.82] [0 to 0.12] [0.02 to 1.3]
Japan 0.32 0.04 0.09 0.92
[0.16 to 0.48] [0.02 to 0.08] [0.04 to 0.1] [0.47 to 1.03]
China 0.19 0.34 0.26 2.72
[0.04 to 0.02] [0.07 to 0.55] [0.03 to 0.32] [0.33 to 3.4]
Other TPP countries 1.42 0.14 0.05 0.54
[0.69 to 1.76] [0.06 to 0.13] [0.08 to 0.32] [0.81 to 3.41]
Other Asia 0.82 0.03 0.47 4.94
[0.45 to 0.68] [0.02 to 0.85] [0.27 to 0.13] [2.9 to 1.4]
Other middle income 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.64
[0.07 to 0.17] [0.06 to 0.3] [0.04 to 0.09] [0.4 to 0.99]
Low income 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.24
[0.13 to 0.35] [0.02 to 0.17] [0.03 to 0.04] [0.27 to 0.46]
Note: Real income (household utility from private consumption), percent change.
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origin-based mutual recognition mechanism for conformity assessments under divergent
national regulations, third country exporters would be worse off. The official narrative
assumes that such spillover benefits will be realized. The magnitudes involved suggest
that regardless of assumptions, it is in the interest of third countries to be rather aggres-
sive in ensuring that non-tariff aspects of TTIP actually are not structured to be deliber-
ately exclusive and discriminatory.
Tables 9 and 10 go beyond average (factor owner) effects per economy and consider
effects on labour income by skill class (low, medium, and high), and other primary fac-
tors (land, other natural resources) relative to capital income. As with Table 7, we report
average (or point estimate) effects as well as confidence bounds in this table. In general
terms, the results in that table indicate that the effects vary both quantitatively and even
qualitatively for relative labour demand across skill groups. For example, the table sug-
gests similar gains for workers across skill categories in the United States, while in the
EU there is relatively more gain for lower skilled workers. There is a striking difference
in returns to land owners (farmers) between the United States and EU. We estimate a
strong gain for US land owners, but strong losses for EU land owners. Especially hard
hit is farmer income from land in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany but not in
Spain or France. Overall, workers in the EU are predicted to gain more than skilled
workers in the United States from the conclusion of a TTIP along the lines of the dis-
criminatory scenario spelled out in Tables 6 and 7. In addition, as in welfare effects, the
magnitude of estimated effects on specific factor incomes (classes of labour, land owners)
hinges on the extent to which an agreement is close to purely de facto discriminatory.
Table 11 provides a summary of trade volume effects under the basic, full discrimina-
tion scenario presented in Tables 7 and 9. Bilaterally, trade volumes between the EU
and United States increase by between 78% (EU exports to the United States) and 82%
(US exports to the EU). This is more or less identical to our point estimates from the
econometric results discussed in Section 3. For other regions, strong negative effects
(from trade diversion) are estimated for EFTA, Japan, the TPP countries, and Turkey.
Other Asia Pacific and low-income exporters actually benefit somewhat in exports to
the transatlantic block and to the world as a whole.
4.4. Modelling comparison to other work on TTIP
Felbermayr et al. (2015, henceforth FHLY) provide a broad overview of related work to
the present matter. Since their paper is published in this issue, we provide a more lim-
ited comparison here to our own estimates.
While our results (exclusive of spillovers) indicate a 2.27% increase for the EU and
0.97% for the United States in real incomes, CEPR (2013) estimates in its multi-sector
CGE study a lower impact with EU GDP increasing by 0.48% and US GDP by 0.39%.
The lower estimated effects are due to different scenario assumptions. While we assume
that liberalization would go all the way to its potential, CEPR (2013) assumes only a
50% reduction of what a full liberalization would imply. In addition to lower ambition
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(in essence a shallower agreement), the CEPR (2013) study covers NTBs for a much nar-
rower set of sectors than we examine here (excluding primary products, other machin-
ery, and other manufacturing, which accounts for one-third of bilateral trade).
Fontagne´ et al. (2013) estimates the impact of a transatlantic trade liberalization using
a different multi-sector CGE model from ours with quite different underlying NTB
AVEs. Fontagne´ et al. (2013) uses lower NTB estimates for agriculture and underlying
NTB estimates for manufacturing are higher in the EU than in the United States unlike
in ECORYS (2009) estimates which are also used in this study. Fontagne´ et al. (2013) es-
timates a 0.3% increase in GDP both for the EU and the United States over the long
run in their basic scenario and 0.5% increase for both economies with harmonization
spillovers.20
While the multi-sector studies presented by both Fontagne´ et al. (2013), CEPR
(2013), and the present paper come to a relatively similar set of conclusions about mod-
est effects of TTIP on the covered economies, FHLY arrive at significantly higher GDP
increases in their single-(goods-only-) sector model. Since the FHLY paper is published
in the same volume and addresses a similar set of issues, there is merit in comparing our
methodology here with that of FHLY. Some key differences are as follows: (i) we present
estimates of key parameters determining trade costs for goods based on the underlying
Table 11. Percent change in exports by region
Exports to EU,
United States
Total exports
United States 82.45 18.49
European Union 78.00 14.47
EFTA 6.72 4.07
Turkey 1.13 1.12
Other Europe 0.15 0.32
Mediterranean 0.36 0.45
Japan 4.24 1.14
China 0.50 0.06
TPP countries 4.77 3.01
Other Asia 2.00 1.66
Other middle income 0.05 0.21
Low income 2.71 0.78
Note: Excludes intra-EU trade.
20 One study that has grained a great deal of traction in the policy debate is Capaldi (2014). That study
uses the UN Global Policy Model. (See Cripps and Izurieta (2014) for documentation.) That model is a
structural macro model with a number of disequilibrium features. The model does not include tariffs or
other trade costs. Logically, also it does not include the basis for gains from trade when such costs are
reduced. Rather, the study simply takes trade volume effects from studies like those discussed here, and
imposes these onto a basic macro model. Without a basis for gains (or losses) from actual trade liberali-
zation, at best such an exercise simply identifies the usual second terms of trade effects implied by
changes in the current account under various CGE-based TTIP assessments. It does not actually pro-
vide an estimate of the impact of TTIP.
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data, while FHLY instead use parameter estimates from other papers (e.g. Egger et al.,
2011) that were obtained from different model parametrizations and different data than
in FHLY. For services, we do rely on estimates from the literature, while FHLY do not
look at services liberalization at all; (ii) the countries that constitute a nascent TTIP are
members of prior PTAs (respectively, the EU or the NAFTA) that are unusually deep
relative to the “normal” or average PTA observed “in the wild.” This suggests the na-
ture, scope, and direct effects of TTIP will not be comparable with those of an average
PTA, but to deep ones. While we pay attention to this point by distinguishing between
tariff and NTB consequences of TTIP that are relevant for the countries to be involved
rather than for the average country-pair in TTIP, FHLY assume that the effects of
previous PTAs on average can proxy for the scope of TTIP; (iii) while we treat NTBs
as involving a mix of cost raising and rent generating barriers, most of the literature
(including FHLY) treats NTBs as pure costs21; (iv) here an economy’s overall production
potential is variable. The model includes input–output linkages across sectors, link-
ages between investment and installed capital stock across sectors, and reallocation
of different skill sets of labour across sectors. The study by FHLY assumes that input–
output linkages are absent, so that an economy’s overall production potential is fixed;
(v) in our multi-sector framework, we distinguish goods from services, while FHLY
do not.22
5. BROADER POLITICAL ECONOMY ISSUES RELATED TO TTIP
The results reported above are based, in part, on some rough judgements about action-
ability. As explained in Section 3, these judgements reflect our beliefs about the political
constraints facing deep liberalization in certain specific NTBs based on our informal
evaluation of the past experience with liberalization in specific sectors and on the results
of the surveys reported in the ECORYS (2009) study. As we have already noted several
21 According to firm and regulatory survey data (see ECORYS, 2009), this practice overstates the poten-
tial cost savings from overall NTB reductions (perhaps by roughly 40–50%).
22 The FHLY assumption that all of an economy’s activity is associated with goods production can bias re-
sults, as has been shown by Egger et al. (2012). There are three reasons for this. First, there is a gap be-
tween a country’s GDP and its total income generated from goods sales from and income from working
in the goods sector. This gap is larger for more developed economies, where the services sector accounts
for more than 70% of an economy’s size. Egger et al. (2012) show that not calibrating economies prop-
erly to their true size and ignoring services leads to largely biased trade cost estimates as well as to
largely biased comparative static effects. In the model quantification, this problem shows up inter alia
in exaggeratedly large domestic production of goods (since all of a country’s GDP that is not traded is
by definition erroneously classified as domestic goods sales, then). Second, earlier work has demon-
strated that trade (or demand) elasticities (see, e.g. Broda and Weinstein, 2006) and levels of NTBs
(ECORYS, 2009; Cadot and Malouche, 2012; Egger et al., 2012) vary substantially across sectors.
Moreover, earlier work shows that trade elasticity levels are a key statistic for gauging quantitative
effects of trade liberalization (Arkolakis et al., 2012). Hence, the two key statistics that are needed to
properly project welfare effects of trade liberalization – domestic sales shares and the elasticity of trade
– vary substantially over sectors.
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE II 567
times, the legal and institutional structures that in the context of trade policy are reason-
ably seen as NTBs are adopted for a wide variety of reasons (only some of which have
anything whatever to do with their effects on trade). As such, for many NTBs, removing
them is not possible because, for example, they require constitutional changes, unrealis-
tic legislative changes, or unrealistic technical changes. Removing NTBs may also be dif-
ficult politically, for example because there is a lack of sufficient economic benefit to
support the effort; because the set of regulations is too broad; or because consumer pref-
erences or language preclude a change. Indeed, even where public perception is not
congruent with scientific evidence, we need to keep in mind that it is the public that
votes, not the evidence. By way of a conclusion, we offer some reflections on political-
economic issues of direct relevance to the outcome of the TTIP negotiations. We begin
with traditional political economy issues related to the distributive politics of TTIP, then
we consider the role of unemployment/adjustment, and finally discuss some non-tradi-
tional issues.
Consider first distributive politics. There is now a sizable literature, in economics and
political science, on the ways political struggles over the returns to trade (and the losses
realized by particular households and sectors in both the short and long run) affect the
outcomes of domestic trade politics and, more relevant for the purposes of this paper,
the outcomes of trade negotiations (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1995a,b; Ornelas,
2005a). The usual goal of political economy papers in general is to explain deviations
from optimal policies, so it is not surprising that most of this work emphasizes how poli-
tics cause deviations from “Liberal trade” (Krishna, 1998; Levy, 1997; Ornelas,
2005b).23 Certainly in the case of TTIP there is no shortage of special interests in both
the United States and Europe seeking to use the negotiations to either increase access to
foreign markets or reduce access to domestic markets. In this paper we identify sectors
that may gain and lose from liberalization of trade between the United States and the
EU, and it should not surprise us to discover that those sectors are actively lobbying their
governments on those issues.24
At the same time, contemporary negotiations between the EU and the United States
take place in a context that offers interesting differences relative to expectations based
on standard models. Most obviously, a substantial amount of trade between the United
States and the EU takes place in differentiated intermediate goods along the lines of
Ethier (1982). At least since the classic paper of Balassa (1966), intra-industry trade (IIT)
has been seen as less disruptive than IIT (Dixon and Menon, 1997; Menon and Dixon,
1997; Bru¨lhart, 2002) and while this inference is not as well-grounded theoretically as
23 Although Ethier (1998, 2001) and Ornelas (2005a, 2008) are exceptions here.
24 For example, US cultural industries seek strong intellectual property protections and increased access
to European markets, while European producers in these sectors seek exemptions to protect national
culture. An interesting case we note below is the US financial sector, which seeks regulatory harmoniza-
tion not only to increase its presence in Europe but, perhaps more importantly, to secure reduced do-
mestic regulation.
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we tend to think (Lovely and Nelson, 2000, 2002), there appears to be empirical support
for the claim.25 Thus, just as integration among the early members of what became the
EU was eased by the relatively low adjustment costs to liberalization of trade, the sizable
role of IIT in US–EU trade may similarly reduce adjustment cost-driven distributive
politics. Similarly, the opportunity to rationalize nationally organized production on an
international basis in sectors like motor vehicles, steel, and chemicals should produce
support for integration where opposition is predicted in standard models. Consistent
with this observation, the European motor vehicle industry is strongly behind the TTIP
(they have been primary drivers of political support, so to speak) while they were ada-
mantly opposed to the EU–Korea agreement and are opposed to an EU–Japan agree-
ment as well. While in the case of TTIP, most of the same firms operate on both sides of
the Atlantic and see opportunity for rationalization, while in the case of EU–Korea or
EU–Japan agreements the situation is closer to the classic one of opposing firms.26
While the prominent role of IIT may lead us to expect lower adjustment costs and,
thus, less dramatic political resistance to liberalized trade between the United States and
the EU than, say, between the United States and China, short-run costs may still be sub-
stantial. That is, analysis of the sort presented in this paper is comparative static in nature
– we compare two long-run equilibria, not the transition between those equilibria.27
Trade economists are well aware that, in standard competitive models, the main source
of long-run gain from trade is specialization and that (loosely speaking) the only way to
secure large gains from trade is for policy to induce large adjustments in production
structure (Ethier, 2009). This of course implies that, in standard competitive models, poli-
cies changes associated with large gains from trade will also be associated with potentially
large transitional costs (mostly in the form of unemployment, forgone wages, and mobility
costs –including such things as loss of asset value from housing). While there is not a lot of
research on this question, the best efforts suggest that the costs are non-trivial. For exam-
ple, Jacobson et al. (1993a,b) estimate that an average displaced worker loses $80,000 in
lifetime earnings and Kletzer (2001) estimates that the average displaced worker suffers a
13% pay cut as a result of trade displacement.28 We have already noted that research on
IIT suggests that these costs may be mitigated when similar countries (i.e. the United
25 Although, consistent with Lovely and Nelson (2000, 2002), Trefler (2004) finds that rationalization ef-
fects dominate in the long run, but that short-term adjustment induced by rationalization involve non-
trivial costs in the short run.
26 See for example Ramsey (2012) and Clark (2014). Lobbying is actually more complex, as Asian manu-
facturers also produce in the EU, and both Toyota and Hyundai are members of the European auto-
makers association.
27 This comment also applies to analyses, like that by Felbermayr et al. (2013), which incorporates equilib-
rium unemployment. While the effect of policy on the long-run equilibrium level of unemployment
(like the effect on long-run equilibrium income distribution) is of considerable relevance to welfare anal-
ysis, its relevance to political economic analysis is considerably more doubtful.
28 Davidson and Matusz (2004) is a convenient summary of results in this area, while Davidson and
Matusz (2010) collects the authors’ important work extending standard models to incorporate
unemployment.
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States and the EU) liberalize due to the major role of, presumptively less disruptive, IIT.
Unfortunately, more recent theoretical and empirical work on trade with heterogeneous
firms qualifies this last presumption, making this an issue of some concern when evaluat-
ing the effects of a major exercise in liberalization like the TTIP.
In the standard model (as well as in models of monopolistic competition), firms are
presumed to be identical. Recent empirical research suggests that this assumption is dra-
matically falsified (Bernard et al., 2007, 2012). Starting with Melitz (2003), a sizable
body of theory and empirical research has developed based on the insight that firms are
heterogeneous and studying how that heterogeneity interacts with international trade
(Redding, 2011; Melitz and Redding, 2015). In fact, this leads to an interesting form of
complexity: On the one hand, heterogeneous firm models provide an additional
source of gains from trade as more efficient firms displace less efficient firms, thus raising
productivity (Melitz and Trefler, 2012; Melitz and Redding, 2013); on the other hand,
the firm-level adjustment means that there is explicit attention to short-run adjustment
on the firm margin that is associated with at least transitional unemployment as
(within sector) inefficient firms close and efficient firms expand. A number of recent pa-
pers have analysed adjustment to a shock which is quite relevant to the TTIP case – the
United States–Canada free trade agreement (and its extension via NAFTA). Starting
especially with Trefler (2004) and applying firm-level data, these papers have examined
the effect of integration with the United States on Canada (e.g. Baggs, 2005; Baggs
and Brander, 2006; LaRochelle-Coˆte´, 2007; Lileeva, 2008; Breinlich and Cun˜at, 2010;
Lileeva and Trefler, 2010). The main result here is that, in the short run relatively
inefficient firms exit, creating unemployment; but in the long-run productivity rises
and unemployed workers are absorbed. Note well that this is precisely in the context
of models of the Krugman sort (except with heterogeneous firms). That is, even
though rationalization may dominate intersectoral adjustment, the within sector,
short-run effects will still be negative and, potentially, substantially negative. From a
political perspective, the short-run negative effects may be every bit as significant
as the long-run efficiency effects. Countries with well-functioning welfare states should
find it easier to liberalize in the face of such shocks than countries that lack such
institutions.
Turning to less standard political-economic issues, distributive politics encourage us to
treat opposition to liberalization as cynical special pleading. However, especially when
we turn from straightforwardly protectionist barriers to trade to harmonization of regula-
tions that are deeply rooted in domestic understandings of identity, the good life, national
safety, et cetera, this inference becomes increasingly strained, even as self-interested
groups re-purpose such arguments to their own advantage. Thus, while purely trade pol-
icy-related negotiations have become increasingly fraught as a result of domestic political
opposition (witness the lengthening periods to resolution of multilateral trade agreements
and the difficulty of American presidents in securing trade promotion authority), as soon
as we consider issues like regulatory harmonization with some kind of non-trivial dispute
resolution process, concerns about surrender of sovereignty are added to standard
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distributional conflicts. It is tempting to treat all such resistance as thinly veiled rent seek-
ing, but this is not really a useful way to understand the underlying politics.29 Consider
three cases of relevance to TTIP: regulation of cultural goods; food safety regulation;
and financial regulation. In all of these cases, there are fundamental differences between
parties engaged in the TTIP negotiations.
Culture is inherently difficult to identify, but it goes to the heart of national identity.
US firms currently dominate the global cultural marketplace. It is easy to see arguments
for globalization as thinly veiled special pleading for US television and filmmakers, mu-
sic and print publishers, et cetera. It is just as easy to see arguments against globalization
as thinly veiled special pleading for national (read “non-US”) producers of the same
goods. However, “culture wars” in the United States make clear just how strong are
claims about the link between culture and identity (Huntington, 2005). Especially in mo-
ments of economic uncertainty, “culture” and identity become strong instruments in-
deed in the political arena. The politics of culture will always be difficult and
unpredictable precisely because they are not anchored in material interests but elicit
strong responses at the ballot box.
Food safety regulation does not turn on quite such strongly intangible concerns, but
still produces very different responses. Food safety is, of course, a shared value between
citizens and governments of both the EU and the United States, and yet the approaches
are fundamentally different. The problem is that many technologies have uncertain fu-
ture effects and, if the effects are at least plausibly sufficiently large, it is necessary to
weigh the gains from admitting such goods into the food system against (possibly low
probability) costs. US law emphasizes immediate scientific process. If chlorine washed
chicken and genetically modified organisms cannot be shown to be dangerous with a
high degree of certainty, there is a presumption that they should be permitted to enter
the market. The European approach emphasizes instead the precautionary principle –
i.e. to the extent that we might reasonably suppose that they constitute risks to the food
system, proponents of sales of chlorine washed chicken or GMOs (genetically modified
organisms) must prove that they are safe with a high degree of certainty. These are both
reasonable, but debatable, principles for evaluating uncertain prospects (Gollier et al.,
2000; Sunstein, 2005). The statement that “both countries agree on the goal of food safe-
ty” only goes so far in resolving a fundamental legal difference about how to evaluate pol-
icies in pursuit of that goal. In addition, of course, parties facing redistributive effects
from any harmonization can use legitimate differences between weighting of type-1 and
type-2 error as tools in rent seeking.
29 This is not to say that such rent seeking is not an essential part of the politics of trade policy. It certainly
is. The point is to recognize that when opponents of liberalization refer to sovereignty concerns, it is
precisely because they tap into powerful notions of community norms that they are effective. Treating
them as simply bad faith is neither good politics, nor good analysis. The inherent difficulty of incorpo-
rating such concerns in systematic analysis makes it all the more important that we recognize them
where they may provide cause for us to be careful in our policy recommendations.
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Finally, it is widely understood, especially in the aftermath of the 2007–8 global eco-
nomic crisis that optimal regulation of the financial sector involves a trade-off of the
gains from efficiency against the (potentially catastrophic, if low probability) losses from
financial crisis. The appropriate policy is affected not only by aggregate attitudes to-
wards risk, but also by uncertainty about both sources of and appropriate responses to
instability. Of particular relevance to TTIP, the United States has recently become
more aggressive in response to financial risk. This leads to concerns about both what the
appropriate policy is and active use of negotiations (especially by US financial institu-
tions) to undermine domestic regulation (Johnson and Schott, 2013).
While non-distributive issues of the sort we have just discussed may be essentially
noise in characterizing the broad dimensions of, say, trade politics considered over some
sizable period of time, when we turn to the prospects for a particular policy choice (say,
TTIP) they should bulk much larger in our calculations. Unfortunately, the role of non-
distributive issues in the framing of political-economic processes is severely understudied
for such an important consideration. Building on Schattschneider’s (1960) classic charac-
terization of democratic politics, Riker (1986) developed a systematic analysis of the way
political entrepreneurs can use valence issues to change political outcomes.30 In our con-
text, the point is that outcomes from the political process around TTIP are highly uncer-
tain precisely because they are linked to public politics via emotionally powerful notions
of identity, patriotism, et cetera. This also serves as a warning about the interpretation
of our welfare results. That is, to the extent that culture, risk preference, and the like en-
ter into our welfare (and there is certainly plenty of evidence that they do), our welfare
results based essentially on national income may be well wide of the mark.
Finally, it is probably worth noting that political-economic context independent of
trade policy can have a strong effect on final outcomes for TTIP. For example, for rea-
sons completely unrelated to TTIP, it seems exceptionally unlikely that the current ad-
ministration will be granted trade promotion authority (fast track) by the current
Congress, or the one that will replace it. Recent extensions of trade promotion authority
have generally involved cross-aisle cooperation of a sort that has disappeared in
American politics. If, as seems likely at this point, a Republican Congress faces a
Democratic President, completion of TTIP seems exceptionally unlikely.
6. SUMMARYAND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have examined the scope for negotiated changes in policy to lead to
changes in transatlantic trade flows. Building on econometric estimates of trade volume
effects under TTIP, we employ a CGE model to gauge the distribution of effects such
an agreement might have across third countries and regions, and on primary factor in-
comes. In this context, we also address the role that effective non-discriminatory
30 For a survey of Riker’s work in this area and work that has built on those insights, see McLean (2002).
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reductions in trade costs may play in determining the pattern of outcomes. For third
countries, the extent to which TTIP is discriminatory has the potential to turn losses to
gains. Phrased differently, a purely discriminatory agreement clearly harms most coun-
tries outside the agreement.
Early in the paper, we noted that North Atlantic trade is, in a sense, smaller than one
might expect given the relative size of the two regions. This raised the question of the
role of policy barriers in explaining the fact. Our econometric results suggest that the ef-
fect of potentially actionable barriers is non-trivial, pointing to an approximate 80%
growth in bilateral trade with an ambitious trade agreement and a fall of about 2.5%
with the rest of the world. However, at the same time, our CGE estimates highlight dis-
tributional impacts across countries and factors not evident from the econometrics alone.
Translated through our CGE framework, in our central case, estimated gains in annual
consumption range between 1% and 2.25% for the United States and EU, respec-
tively.31 Similar losses stand out for regions with strong trade linkages to the United
States and EU, including Turkey, EFTA, and the Asia-Pacific economies that make up
the TTIP camp. Within the United States and EU, we see that while labour stands to
gain (across skill categories), as do farmers (land owners) in the United States, farmers in
the EU stand to lose in our central scenario.
From a policy perspective, then, because the economics show a moderate gain for the
TTIP partners, and only quite modest income distribution effects within TTIP, the eco-
nomics argue in favour of the policy. However, as we argue in the previous section, as
TTIP contemplates potentially large changes in NTBs that are associated with more
complex understandings of the implications of globalization. As these have the potential
to raise political risks for national leaders, the relatively modest gains suggest that we
may see caution. Furthermore, these factors suggest greater difficulty in getting to a
maximal agreement.
Discussion
Wolf Wagner
Tilburg University
The paper by Egger et al. subjects itself to a tall order. The European Union and the
United States are negotiating a wide-ranging agreement, the TTIP. Besides covering
the classic case of reductions in trade tariffs, it also aims at the reduction of NTBs. But
the scope of the agreement does not stop there. Next to reducing trade-frictions, it also
31 Of course, for some countries external to TTIP, the changes in trade can be more substantial, e.g.
EFTA trade with TTIP falls by 6.7%; trade with Japan falls by 4.2%; and TPP falls by $0.8%.
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aims to increase cooperation across the two regions generally, such as by facilitating har-
monization of regulatory standards.
The purpose of the paper is to try to quantify the gains from this far-reaching agree-
ment. There are two elements required for this. First, one needs a model to calculate the
gains. Egger et al. use a computable general equilibrium model, which features a pro-
duction world economy that can be broken down into countries and sectors. Such a
model allows to estimate the welfare impact of a well-defined policy change, such as
coming from a tariff-reduction. Second, one needs to define the policy exercise. Egger
et al. consider three different sources of changes arising from TTIP: tariff reductions
generally, non-tariff reductions (NTBs) in goods, and non-tariff reductions in services.
While modelling the tariff reductions is straightforward, things are more difficult for
non-tariff reductions. The approach taken for goods is to estimate the impact of NTBs
through gravity equations. The paper considers past free-trade agreements and esti-
mates their impact on international trade. The estimates can in turn be mapped into an
ad valorem equivalent, which makes them directly comparable to a trade-tariff reduction.
The findings of the paper are interesting. There are important, but not very large,
welfare gains to be obtained for the countries participating in the agreement. There is
also significant heterogeneity in the distribution of the gains. First, some countries within
the agreement gain more than others. Second, even within countries the effects can be
very asymmetric. For example, whereas labour stands to gain across skill categories,
farmers in the EU stand to lose. Third countries outside the agreement are slated to lose
through a reduction in trade.
The paper provides a comprehensive and authoritative evaluation of the TTIP. We
can expect this paper to become the benchmark against which to evaluate the TTIP of
gains, and it will surely be well cited by various stakeholders in the process. The authors
do, in particular, a good job of discussing the inevitable choices one has to make along
the way, as well as their implications for the final numbers. They are also very clever in
separating good information (e.g. information about tariff-reductions) from progressively
worse information.
Since the TTIP is such a complex and far-reaching agreement, the estimates have to
be taken with a grain of salt, however. Many assumptions have to be made by the
authors to arrive at the results. Albeit they appear reasonable, the actual TTIP impact
may turn out be quite different from the one predicted by the paper. First, the estima-
tion of the impact of the removal of non-trade barriers for goods are based on previous
deep trade agreements. Underlying is thus the assumption that such agreements have a
similar effect than the TTIP will have. This requires a leap of faith as past trade agree-
ments covered quite different sets of countries and also tended to be more limited than
the TTIP. The estimates for the NTBs for services also contain a speculative element. In
particular it is assumed that the NTB-part of the agreement leads to half of the reduc-
tion in the ad valorem equivalents that would be obtained from a full elimination of bar-
riers. This is obviously ad hoc (however, it is reassuring that the service-estimates are not
driving the overall results). A similar ad hoc assumption is needed to quantify the gains
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from spillovers to other countries (third countries, e.g. may adopt standards developed
within the TTIP).
An intriguing part of the results is the displayed heterogeneity in the gains, both
within and across countries. Future work may pick up on this. For example, the esti-
mates may be used to better understand the sources of popular resistance against the
pact. In particular, it may be interesting to see whether the groups that tend to be most
opposed to the agreement are also the ones that are actually losing from the agreement.
Such an exercise is important, as it may help to smoothen the part to a successful TTIP.
In many cases it will probably turn out that the concerns of a specific group opposed to
TTIP are actually unjustified. And in the case where they are justified, additionally pol-
icy measures could be taken to broaden support for the TTIP.
Panel discussion
Because the authors of the paper were not present in the panel, Richard Baldwin, as the
chair of the session, suggested pursuing a general discussion on the literature. He
pointed out that in the old days trade was about goods crossing borders and the main
barriers were tariffs and the notions that look like tariffs. Yet, currently, the nature of
trade has changed, and what are now crossing the borders are factories. He also pointed
out that the work is as complicated as the single European act. The commission has
spent $600,000 on studies trying to figure out the effects of the European act, so it is a
brave effort to try to handle that in one paper.
Following upon Baldwin, Jan Pieter Krahnen asked whether it is legitimate to make
forecasts based on the estimates from data belonging to earlier periods if the nature of
trade was changed. Answering the question, Baldwin pointed out that the data for facto-
ries crossing borders are available at least for a couple of decades.
Jeromin Zettelmeyer asked whether the set-up in the paper includes input–output
tables, and whether the analysis provides adequate treatment of the effect of value
chains. Furthermore, he explained that the TTIP involves a trade-off between welfare
facts driven by trade and services liberalization, and lining regulatory standards involv-
ing some loss of sovereignty. Thus, he wondered whether the paper makes any com-
ments on the value of the investment chapter of the TTIP. Thorsten Beck added that it
is not clear how the investment story would fit into the model. Richard Baldwin agreed
with Thorsten Beck by stating that intra-firm transfers of technology or know-how in
general across borders are not covered in the paper.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at Economic Policy online.
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APPENDIX 1: GRAVITY ESTIMATES OF NTB COST REDUCTIONS
EMPIRICAL MODEL OUTLINE
In this appendix, we describe the basic procedure to control for endogeneity in selec-
tion into trade agreements. For the gravity estimates reported in Section 3 of the paper,
we follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Egger et al. (2011) and Egger and
Pfaffermayr (2011) in employing a generalized-linear exponential-family model for esti-
mating gravity models. One merit of such models is that, unlike ordinary least squares
on the log-transformed model, they obtain consistent parameters in the presence of het-
eroskedasticity even if it is unknown whether the disturbance term is log-additive or
level-additive. Furthermore, in line with Terza (1998, 2009), Greene (2002, 2012),
Terza et al. (2008), and Egger et al. (2011), we apply a control-function approach
which, under a set of assumptions summarized below, is capable of absorbing the endo-
geneity problem and obtaining consistent parameter estimates, including the partial
treatment effects of interest.
Formally, we employ imports of country j from country i, Xij, as the dependent var-
iable and specify it as an exponential function of a linear index of the form
Xij ¼ expðdij ad þ tij at þ ei þ mj þ cðzijÞÞuij ; (A.1)
where dij is a PTA-depth measure (a scalar or a vector, depending on the specifica-
tion), tij is a vector of observable (log) trade-cost measures (such as log distance, . . . .),
ða0d ; a0tÞ0 is a conformable parameter vector, fei;mjg catch-all measures of exporter-
and importer-specific factors (estimated as parameters on i-specific and j-specific bi-
nary indicator variables, respectively. Moreover,
cðzijÞ ¼ hij ah ¼ ðh1;ij ; . . . ; hD;ijÞah; (A.2)
is a control function which is derived from the assumption of multivariate normality of
the disturbances between the processes of selecting into depth d¼ 1, . . . , D and the
stochastic term about Xij . The application here represents an innovation on the existing
literature, which generally focuses on binary selection in the case of trade agreements.
The control function absorbs the potential endogeneity bias (i.e. the correlation of
dij with the disturbances). After introducing a binary indicator variable 1½dij ¼ d
which is 1 if the statement in square brackets is true and zero else, the elements hd;ij
for d¼ 1, . . . , D are defined as follows.
hd;ij ¼ /ðzij ad;zÞð1 1½dij ¼ dAðzij ad;zÞÞAðzij ad;zÞ (A.3)
These are referred to as inverse Mills’ ratios (for dij ¼ d) in the literature (see
e.g. Wooldridge, 2010). They depend on the density, /ðzij ad;zÞ, and the cumulative
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distribution function, Aðzij ad;zÞ, which, in a reduced form, depends on common ob-
servable characteristics, zij , and the depth-specific parameter vector ad;z.
Notice that the assumption about multivariate normality is specific here, since selection
into states d is mutually exclusive (a country-pair can only apply a single level of depth d
of an agreement). This means that we can think of the variance–covariance matrix for
each country-pair ij where we order the data such that the terms for the D latent vari-
ables generating hd;ij appear at the top and the stochastic term for Xij appears at the bot-
tom. Apart from diagonal elements throughout, this matrix would then contain only non-
zero elements in the bottom row and the right column.
A somewhat different approach to the control function could be based on an or-
dered probit model about dij ¼ d rather than individual probit models for each state
d. This approach would be somewhat more parsimonious in terms of the number
of parameters to be estimated. In contrast to the aforementioned approach, this
procedure would be based on d-specific elements hd;ij for d¼ 1, . . . , D which are de-
fined as
hd;ij ¼ /ðld1  zij azÞ  /ðld  zij azÞAðld  zij azÞ Aðld1  zij azÞ
(A.4)
Notice that ld1 and ld are depth-specific, implicitly determined threshold values
which determine whether country-pair ij is in regime d 1 versus d. Hence, in con-
trast to hd;ij estimated from individual probit models as in Equation (A.3) above and
say DK parameters (where K is the number of parameters per probit equation), their
counterparts in Equation (A.4) are estimated based on only DþK1 parameters
(where the K1 are the parameters on l1; . . . ; lDf g, excluding l0, which is part of
the D parameters in the base model).
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
The control-function approach outlined above rests on three basic assumptions. First,
that the disturbances of the latent variables determining selection into a particular
depth-of-trade agreements and the outcome equation (for Xij ) are multivariate nor-
mal, whereby the stochastic terms for each country-pair ij are drawn independently
from but identically to those of other pairs. In the present case, they are bivariate nor-
mal for each and every level of depth, d. Second, the universe of instruments collected
in zij (which includes all determinants of the outcome model except for the elements
in hij and some additional identifying regressors, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005))
should be independent of the multivariate error terms (i.e., the instruments should be
exogenous). Third and finally, the variances of the latent processes determining selec-
tion-into-agreement-depth are normalized to unity.
The first stage is estimated by probit models on each level of depth of a PTA
{1, . . . , 7} separately. Hence, we estimate seven individual probits, allowing the
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parameters to vary between the equations. This strategy corresponds to a model
where we estimate the probability
Aðzij ad;z þ ed;ij  0Þ; (A.5)
where ed;ij is the disturbance term about which bivariate normality is assumed with
the disturbance term in the trade equation in logs, lnðuijÞ; whereby A ð Þ can be esti-
mated by probit for each level of d¼ {1, . . . , 7}.
We specify zij as to include log distance, land adjacency, two indicators of common
language (ethnology-based and official), common colonizer, colonial relationship, the
combined economic mass of countries i and j in terms of log GDP, a trade embedd-
edness index for the two countries i and j (measuring the overlap in the trade partner
network) and a full set of exporter as well as importer country indicator variables.
FIRST-STAGE MODEL RESULTS
The results of the first-stage probit models are summarized in Table A1 for all seven
levels of PTA depths. The results suggest that having a PTA of any level of depth tends
to become more likely the less (geographically or culturally) distant two economies are,
Table A1. Probit selection equations modelling the probability of having a PTA
with a particular level of depth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trade embeddedness 6.212** 5.249*** 14.017*** 15.321*** 20.686*** 0.884 10.220
index for 2009 (2.281) (4.504) (3.663) (4.629) (3.126) (0.151) (1.161)
Log bilateral distance 0.295*** 0.808*** 0.925*** 0.335*** 0.617*** 0.539*** 1.347***
(3.585) (17.966) (12.110) (5.480) (6.417) (6.429) (10.826)
Land contiguity 0.414* 0.858*** 0.009 0.174 0.581** 0.403 0.674*
(1.804) (5.828) (0.037) (0.756) (2.014) (1.345) (1.841)
Common language ethnology 0.301 0.169 0.014 0.345 1.250*** 0.364 0.701*
(0.867) (1.184) (0.058) (1.517) (3.911) (0.922) (1.878)
Common ofﬁcial language 0.974** 0.037 0.437* 0.905*** 1.573*** 0.363 0.703*
(2.444) (0.243) (1.709) (3.926) (4.493) (0.972) (1.818)
Common colonizer 0.508** 0.446*** 0.298 0.416 0.664* 2.215*
(2.035) (3.668) (0.990) (1.463) (1.750) (1.671)
Colonial relationship 1.834*** 0.787*** 0.049 0.123 0.531 0.087 1.035***
(3.468) (3.305) (0.134) (0.417) (0.906) (0.175) (2.606)
Economic mass of exporter
and importer together
(in log GDPs)
0.005 0.040*** 0.082*** 0.027 0.015 0.015 0.067**
(0.196) (3.611) (3.548) (1.423) (0.341) (0.656) (2.246)
PCA1 0.395*** 0.005 0.202*** 0.402*** 0.119* 0.212** 2.435
(4.608) (0.164) (2.868) (9.362) (1.872) (2.163) (1.170)
PCA2 0.516*** 0.163*** 0.083 0.034 0.233** 0.221** 0.615
(3.191) (2.731) (0.861) (0.440) (2.552) (2.290) (0.694)
PCA3 0.499*** 0.240*** 0.508** 0.003 0.040 0.668*** 1.362
(2.893) (2.851) (2.209) (0.019) (0.182) (2.794) (0.854)
N 1,406 7,734 3,842 3,530 2,400 3,089 1,406
Pseudo R2 0.4185 0.5023 0.6504 0.4898 0.6316 0.4702 0.7553
Notes: PCA1, PCA2, PAC3 are ﬁrst three weighted components from principal components analysis of differences
in polity, civil society, corruption, and functioning of government indexes. Probit regressions include country ﬁxed
effects.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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the larger two economies are, and the more overlapping their trade partner network is.
We use the three principal components of four political variables (one on the absolute
difference in the functioning of government index published by Economic Freedom
House; one on the absolute difference in the civil liberties index published by
Economic Freedom House; one on the absolute difference in the political freedom in-
dex published by Economic Freedom House; and one on the absolute difference in the
corruption perceptions index published by Transparency International).
The three associated principal components vary at the country-pair level, and we
include them in both the first-stage (agreement-depth-selection) models and the sec-
ond-stage (gravity) models.
Table A2. Sensitivity analysis for stage two gravity regressions, total merchan-
dise trade
A B C D E F
ln(1þtariff) 4.743 4.659 4.608 4.629 4.672 4.799
(2.87)*** (2.87)*** (2.84)*** (2.84)*** (2.87)*** (2.99)***
ln(distance) 0.780 0.776 0.783 0.777 0.780 0.762
(20.36)*** (20.37)*** (20.40)*** (20.25)*** (20.72)*** (21.98)***
Common colony 0.320 0.310 0.299 0.312 0.307 0.313
(2.13)** (2.05)** (1.97)** (2.06)** (2.01)** (2.04)**
Common language 0.467 0.464 0.465 0.463 0.478 0.465
(5.67)*** (5.65)*** (5.71)*** (5.60)*** (5.81)*** (5.64)***
Common border 0.497 0.488 0.464 0.486 0.473 0.484
(5.10)*** (4.93)*** (4.83)*** (4.97)*** (4.88)*** (4.93)***
Former colony 0.626 0.628 0.614 0.630 0.620 0.625
(5.48)*** (5.48)*** (5.32)*** (5.51)*** (5.39)*** (5.36)***
European Union 0.575 0.545 0.451 0.560 0.532 0.527
(4.54)*** (4.30)*** (3.49)*** (4.36)*** (4.11)*** (4.62)***
FTA depth 0.087 0.086 0.076 0.088 0.079 0.093
(3.74)*** (3.70)*** (3.18)*** (3.82)*** (3.34)*** (5.79)***
Polity index 0.370
(2.48)**
Functioning of
government index
0.130
(0.93)
Corruptionindex 0.295
(2.29)**
Civil societyindex 0.202
(1.19)
PCA1 0.012 0.008
(0.67) (0.47)
PCA2 0.080 0.073
(2.84)*** (2.61)***
PCA3 0.028 0.029
(0.31) (0.32)
N 10,721 10,720 10,721 10,721 10,721 10,721
Pseudo R2 0.8093 0.8087 0.8090 0.8088 0.8093 0.8093
Notes: PCA1, PCA2, PAC3 are ﬁrst three weighted components from principal components analysis of differences
in polity, civil society, corruption, and functioning of government indexes. In main text, we report results for spec-
iﬁcation A.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE II 579
The probit model results for each agreement-depth level are reported in Table A1,
where we refer to the main political variable components by PCA1–PCA3.
SOME ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR THE EMPIRICAL MODELS
The purpose of this Appendix is to show some alternative regression results regarding
both the (first-stage) selection-into-deeper-agreements model and the (second-stage)
gravity model.
Regarding the first-stage agreement-depth selection model, we choose an alterna-
tive specification which includes a different set of political determinants from the one
employed in the outset. We summarize alternative (second-stage) gravity-model re-
sults in Table A2. This table includes six alternative gravity-model specifications that
differ in terms of the political/institutional control variables used. The first four
Columns A–D of this table include the four political/institutional variables one at a
time (“polity index” is the absolute difference in the political freedom index published
by Economic Freedom House; “functioning of government index” is the absolute dif-
ference in the functioning of government index published by Economic Freedom
House; “corruption index” is the absolute difference in the corruption perceptions in-
dex published by Transparency International; and “civil liberties index” is the abso-
lute difference in the civil liberties index published by Economic Freedom House).
Column E includes the aforementioned three principal components of the set of polit-
ical/institutional variables. The associated results for the economic variables are very
similar across all columns. The last column excludes our endogeneity corrections, and
comparison of Columns E and F shows the impact this exclusion has on the estimated
effect of FTA depth.
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